

**ALLIANCE****China and Russia: a burgeoning alliance/ Stephen Blank***Proceedings US Naval Institute: March 2020, pp.62-66 (86)*

The complicated relationship between Russia and China has moved from adversarial to mutually supportive and friendly especially after Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed an alliance with China.

**ARMED CONFLICTS****Power and comparative methods: performing the worlds of armed conflicts/ Bruno Charbonneau and Adam Sandor***Civil Wars : Vol.21 No.4, December 2019, pp.437-447 (110)*

This Special Issue emphasises how power and power relations involved in establishing limits and boundaries to define, categorise and understand the world through comparison are intimately tied to conflict and intervention practices and dynamics. Indeed, when pundits, practitioners, academics and even conflict actors compare settings of armed conflict and intervention, they are participating in an inherently political move. Our comparisons perform worlds of armed conflict, and international interventions more often than not reflect those performances.

**The Middle East is violence: on the limits of comparative approaches to the study of armed conflict/ Jacob Mundy***Civil Wars : Vol.21 No.4, December 2019, pp.539-568 (110)*

This article provides a theory of the Middle East based on the violent practices that have made and reproduced the Middle East as a region, both materially and ideationally. Though critical of comparative approaches to the study of armed conflicts, this argument models a different way to understand them.

**ARMS CONTROL****Securing compliance with arms control agreements/ Susan Koch and Thomas Scheber***Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.1, 2019, pp.1-87 (113)*

This report goes one step further by not only explaining why some countries or leaders chose not to comply, but also what lessons we have, or we should have, learned from these historical case studies to apply to today's compliance concerns. The cases studied in this report vary in antagonists, interests and objectives of the parties, time periods, agreements transgressed, military capabilities subject to limits, types of violations, evasion tactics, enforcement measures, means to resist cheating penalties, and outcomes. One case deals primarily with conventional forces, two with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and one with a non-offensive capability (an illegal radar).

**ASEAN****ASEAN-China COVID-19 meeting: why and what's next?/ Zi Yang***RSIS Commentary : No. 0032, 28 February 2020 (F31)*

The 20 February ASEAN-China foreign ministers meeting in Vientiane, Laos was a watershed in bringing together China and ASEAN member states to combat the COVID-19 epidemic. Driven by security and economic interests, ASEAN and China decided to expand collaboration in many areas to address mutual concerns in public health security.

**ASEAN special operations forces/ Andrew White***Military Technology: Vol. XLIV, Issue 2, 2020, pp.35-36 (38)*

Comprising of a group of 10 member states, ASEAN is ideally situated to provide the central spine of the region, to support on any ongoing counterterrorism and maritime security.

**ASIA****Future warfare: the two-dimensional security challenge/  
Steven Metz**

*RSIS Commentary : No. 0022, 5 February 2020 (F31)*

While it is difficult to precisely predict the future of armed conflict, two things seem likely: Asia will be the vortex of the global security system; and armed conflict will have both conventional and hybrid dimensions.

**AUSTRALIA****Exploring interrelationships between high-level drug trafficking and other serious and organised crime: an Australian study/ Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes**

*Global Crime : Vol.21, No 1, February 2020, pp. 28-50 (111)*

This paper uses open source law enforcement data to explore interrelationships in Australia. A database was compiled of all reported criminal incidents of high-level drug trafficking between 2011 and 2017 and any concurrent charges for other serious and organised crime (SOC), sourced from official reports and press releases of Australian federal law enforcement and criminal intelligence agencies. It discusses the implications for research, policy and practice.

**AUTOMATED WARFARE****The coming of automated warfare/ Michael T. Klare**

*Current History: Vol 119, No.813, January 2020, pp.9-14 (20)*

The progression from semiautonomous, unarmed supply robots to fully autonomous weapons systems is likely to occur rapidly and with limited public scrutiny. This raises fundamental questions about the future of warfare, the role of humans on the battlefield and the ethics and legality of robotic combat.

**CHINA****China/Russia 2035/ Dylan Monks**

*Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.4, 2019, pp.327-346 (113)*

The relationship between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China is one of great complexity and importance to policymakers tasked with forming U.S. foreign policy. Considering the long-term implications for U.S. strategy, the research seeks to anticipate future trends in the Sino/Russia relationship. From a list of highlighted "driving forces" in the Sino/Russia relationship, the research points to two critical uncertainties (U.S. policy and Central Asia) that could dictate the future relationship between the two powers. The study recommends a change in U.S. policy that accounts for the growing environmental and technological tensions that are driving current geopolitical unrest in the developing world and suggests that a change is taking place in how the global community defines, conceptually, the role of great-power politics.

**Counterterrorism and preventive repression: China's changing strategy in Xinjiang/ Sheena Chestnut Greitens**

*International Security : Vol 44, No 3, Winter 2019/20, pp.9-47 (68)*

In 2017-18, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed its domestic security strategy in Xinjiang, escalating the use of mass detention, ideological re-education and pressure on Uyghur diaspora networks. Commonly proposed explanations for this shift focus on domestic factors: ethnic unrest, minority policy, and regional leadership. The CCP's strategy changes in Xinjiang, however, were also likely catalyzed by changing perceptions of the threat posed by Uyghur contact with transnational Islamic militant groups in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and a corresponding increase in perceived domestic vulnerability.

## CHINA

**China's emerging disaster diplomacy: what it means for Southeast Asia/ Lina Gong**

*RSIS Commentary : No. 0023, 6 February 2020 (F31)*

The Chinese government formed two new bodies in 2018 that have been expected to improve China's response to natural hazards and humanitarian emergencies in other countries. What are the implications for Southeast Asia, where the risk and threat of different types of disaster persist?

## CYBER

**Why can't we be friends? challenges to international cyberwarfare cooperation efforts and the way ahead/ Gil Baram and Harel Menashri**

*Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.2, 2019, pp.89-97 (113)*

In the past few years, there has been growing recognition of the importance of international cooperation concerning cyberwarfare norms. To this end, a number of international forums have been established, but as of now, they have had limited success. We recognize three major challenges to the success these forums: (1) the problem of trust, (2) varying threat perceptions, and (3) different definitions of state sovereignty. We analyze the existing disagreements between the U.S., Russia, and China, and show how a "bottom-up" solution like the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace can facilitate reaching an agreement despite these differences.

## CYBER

**Mixed Signals: A Flawed Approach to Cyber Deterrence/ Alexander Klimburg**

*Survival: Vol.62, No.1, February - March 2020, pp.107-130 (106)*

The conduct and deployment of the United States Cyber Command's (CYBERCOM) vision of 'persistent engagement' represents a radical and largely unwelcome departure from previous notions of conflict in cyberspace. It justifies a much more aggressive CYBERCOM mission that ignores the potential for unwanted effects that could prove to be highly destabilising in an already volatile international security environment.

**Detering Cyber Coercion: the exaggerated problem of attribution/ David Blagden**

*Survival: Vol.62, No.1, February - March 2020, pp.131-148 (106)*

The political interests being advanced by a cyber-attack will often make the identity of the aggressor clear, even if the origin of the attack itself cannot be readily traced via technical means. The prominence of deterrence by punishment in Western cyber strategy has grown in line with capabilities and understanding. The 2011 cyberdefence strategies of the United States and United Kingdom - the two most capable Western cyber powers - did not mention retaliation, although both referred to deterrence and dwelt extensively on hardening and resilience.

**CYBER**

**Cyber war and lessons from history in the digital age/ R. Gerald Hughes**

*Intelligence and National Security : Vol. 35, No 2, March 2020, pp.300-305 (99)*

It explains how vital it is to understand the benefits and pitfalls of cyber technology by discussing historical cases of new technology shaping weaponry, war and preventing conflict. They argue, 'To realize its benefits, and to minimize the technology's destructive potential, the widest possible range of societies and states must learn to steward it wisely'. Through historical analysis of earlier technologies, it highlights on shed light on military-technological issues surrounding the use of cyber weapons, how effective they could be in a war and preventing cyber conflict.

**CYBER SECURITY**

**Iran and its neighbors face risks and opportunities in cyber security/ Gawdat Bahgat**

*Orbis: Volume 64, Issue 1, 2020, pp.78-97 (44)*

The nature of warfare has changed dramatically in the last few years and is certain to continue changing in the coming years. Adversaries are less likely to use traditional military strikes. Rather, they are more likely to compete in the so-called "Gray Zone". The term refers to an activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but deliberately is designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict. The cyber domain is a major arena in this gray zone. This article examines how Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional adversaries (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Israel) have developed and utilized cyber warfare capabilities.

**DISASTER POLICY**

**Making collective policy entrepreneurship work : the case of China's post - disaster reconstruction/ Na Tang**

*Journal Of Asian Public Policy : March 2020, Vol 13. No 1, pp.60-78*

This paper presents a case study of a group of officials who enabled collective policy entrepreneurship work by combining social acuity, problem of reframing, common interests, lack of resources and complementary capabilities.

**GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY**

**Beyond COVID-19: global priorities against future contagion/ Jose Montesclaros**

*RSIS Commentary : No. 0030, 20 February 2020 (F31)*

Given the credible threat of disease re-emergence and evolution, governments today should allocate resources to preventing future novel diseases, even as they face 'wartime conditions' in battling COVID-19.

**INDONESIA**

**Repatriating militants: Indonesia's dilemma & its consequences/ Cameron Sumpter and Chaula R. Anindya**

*RSIS Commentary : No. 0029, 19 February 2020 (F31)*

Repatriating and reintegrating citizens who travelled to the Middle East to join ISIS is uncertain, expensive and politically unpopular. But leaving them in hazardous refugee camps with thousands of likeminded militants may pose even greater long-term problems.

**ISLAMIC STATE****Why do armed nonstate groups use foreign volunteers? the case of the Islamic State/ Barak Mendelsohn**

*Orbis: Volume 64, Issue 1, 2020, pp.111-130 (44)*

Why do some armed nonstate groups seek foreign volunteers while others do not? This article identifies four variables - political considerations, operational needs, organizational capacity, and ideational fit - that shape armed nonstate actors' choices concerning foreign volunteers. The essay also presents an original theory for how these variables interact. It argues that while both operational and political considerations inform a group's position on foreign volunteers, when the two conflict, political considerations take priority. In addition, organizational capacity determines a group's ability to translate need into action, serving as a necessary (but insufficient) condition for foreign mobilization.

**IT****On the social science of ransomware: technology, security, and society/ Alex Wilner**

*Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.4, 2019, pp.347-370 (113)*

Ransomware is a type of malware that either encrypts or steals digital data and demands a financial ransom from the victim in order to release or return them. The frequency and severity of contemporary ransomware, the nature and motivation of the perpetrators who use these methods of attack, and the type of targets victimized by these attacks - from federal governments to city municipalities, and from private companies to private citizens - suggests that ransomware be afforded much greater scholarly attention by social scientists. Ransomware is a security problem that has international, political, intelligence, and diplomatic ramifications. This article provides a detailed description of ransomware tailored to the social sciences. Using seven ransomware case studies, the article breaks down the technology's technical barriers, making ransomware more accessible to public policy and national security debates and analysis.

**IT****Pair AI with emerging tech to create smart convoys/ Collin Fox**

*Proceedings US Naval Institute: February 2020, pp.52-56 (86)*

Unmanned systems teamed with artificial intelligence can strengthen maritime logistics for the next peer flight. The Navy must acknowledge the problem then relentlessly test, integrate and apply AI technology and operational concepts.

**MALAYSIA****Exploring the use of 'third countries' in proliferation networks: the case of Malaysia/ Daniel Salisbury**

*European Journal of International Security : Vol 4 Issue 1, February 2019, pp.101-122*

This article proposes a loose typology considering the ways in which third countries can be exploited by proliferation networks. The typology is illustrated using three cases involving entities based in Malaysia - A. Q. Khan's nuclear black market network, and Iran and North Korea's efforts to procure and market WMD-related and military goods. These cases are used to generate insights into proliferators' selection of 'third country' hubs. The article argues that while exploitation of third countries by proliferation networks is a similar, but distinct phenomenon to trade-based sanctions busting, hubs of both activities share characteristics. Furthermore, the article argues that other factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, such as level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving the decisions of proliferation networks. The article concludes with implications for nonproliferation policy.

## MARITIME

**Wading tiger, swimming dragon: a study on comparative Indo-Sino naval development/ Paul Weisko**

*Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.3, 2019, pp.198-205 (113)*

In this article, a study on the newly commissioned ships and ships in development in the Chinese and Indian navies to analyze how the Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) and the Indian Navy view the other's modernization. It was argued that the Chinese and Indian navies' development can be explained by defensive realism and that they will take steps according to this view. It was predicted that the Indians will focus on developing a navy that can defeat the PLA-N in Indian-dominated waters, while the PLA-N will develop anti-submarine assets to counter the Indian nuclear triad.

## MILITARY

**A dangerous pathway? toward a theory of special forces/ Alastair Finlan**

*Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.4, 2019, pp.255-275 (113)*

This article explores what is considered by some to be a dangerous pathway: the development of a theory of special forces. The world is now in the third age of special forces and these secret military units are at the forefront of the use of force in international relations. This research identifies a large theory-knowledge gap concerning these military "first responders" for modern nation-states and offers a tentative theory of special forces that goes beyond traditional annihilation/attrition models of war toward a new anaphylaxis model. It makes the case that the theory pathway is not dangerous, but emancipatory.

## MILITARY

**A guide for thinking about space deterrence and China/ Steve Lambakis**

*Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.6, 2019, pp.497-553 (113)*

U.S. space systems are the backbone of the U.S. economy and national security. Chinese counter-space weapon developments promise to make the satellite protection mission ever more challenging. There are significant challenges to deterring China from aggressive behaviour in space, and for this reason U.S. policy makers and defence planners must start planning now for a possible future military confrontation involving China that also may involve military space contingencies. The purpose of this report is to provide a framework for thinking about deterrence and the protection of U.S. space assets.

**Conceal or reveal? managing clandestine military capabilities in peacetime competition/ Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long**

*International Security : Vol 44, No 3, Winter 2019/20, pp.48-83 (68)*

International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These "clandestine capabilities" pose problems for converting military advantages into political gains. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed, then adversaries will be unaware of, and unimpressed by, the real balance of power.

**MILITARY**

**Presidents, politics, and military strategy: electoral constraints during the Iraq War/ Andrew Payne**

*International Security : Vol 44, No 3, Winter 2019/20, pp.163-203 (68)*

How do electoral politics affect presidential decision-making in war? As both commander in chief and elected officeholder, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national interest and political survival when assessing alternative military strategies in war. Yet, how and when electoral pressures influence decision-making during an ongoing conflict remains unclear.

**Procurement programmes for land forces/ Robert Czulda**

*Military Technology: Vol. XLIV, Issue 2, 2020, pp.12-15 (38)*

Despite an increase in new and emerging unconventional threats, land forces around the world continue to focus on traditional platforms such as tanks and armoured vehicles of various types. Recent and planned procurements clearly show this to be a trend that will endure into the near future.

**Controlling weapons circulation in a postcolonial militarised world/ Anna Stavrianakis**

*Review of International Studies: Vol 45, Issue 1, January 2019, pp.57-76 (45)*

Taking the tensions between arms transfer control and militarism as a starting point, it is argued that the negotiating process and eventual treaty text demonstrate competing modes of militarism. Expressed in terms of sovereignty, political economy, or human security, all three modes are underpinned by ongoing imperial relations: racial, gendered, and classed relations of asymmetry and hierarchy that persist despite formal sovereign equality. This means human security is a form of militarism rather than the antithesis of it. The argument reframes the challenges for controlling weapons circulation, placing the necessity for feminist, postcolonial anti-militarist critique front and centre.

**MILITARY EQUIPMENT**

**Go-to guns: military handguns and pistols/ Andrew White**

*Military Technology: Vol. XLIII, Issue 3, 2019, pp.36-40 (38)*

Constituting a final resort in personal defence as well as primary weapon system capable of supporting small units operations in congested areas of operation, handgun technology and associated enhancements continue to be a significant focus for armed forces globally.

**NAVAL WARFARE**

**Satellite systems for naval warfare/ Norman Friedman**

*Naval Forces: Vol.XLI, No.1, 2020, pp.51-52 (41)*

The vastness of the sea makes satellite systems particularly valuable for navies. They offer high-capacity communication, precise navigation and reconnaissance.

**NORTH KOREA**

**Lessons for negotiating with North Korea/ Edward Ifft**

*Survival: Vol.62, No.1, February - March 2020, pp.89-106 (106)*

Applying certain lessons learned in earlier arms-control negotiations, some of which encountered problems similar to those that are now frustrating negotiators and observers, could move the process forward. The Trump administration has called for North Korea also to give up chemical and biological weapons. This might be better phrased as seeking a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

**NUCLEAR POWER****The third nuclear age/ Jenny L. Naylor***Comparative Strategy: Vol.38, No.4, 2019, pp.276-288 (113)*

This article asserts that a technology-enabled, multipolar competition will usher in the third nuclear age, which may be identified by three trends: (1) a new arms race with revolutionary weapons that challenge the existing deterrence paradigm; (2) an entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear force and doctrinal development in the multipolar competition; and (3) a state-driven model of innovation. The article then concludes that new thinking on deterrence geometry, global governance of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, and nuclear strategy will be needed to maintain strategic stability in the third nuclear age.

**NUCLEAR WEAPON****Cyber battles, nuclear outcomes? dangerous new pathways to escalation/ Michael T. Klare***Arms Control Today: Vol.49, No. 9, November 2019, pp.6-13 (5)*

Trump administration's Nuclear Posture Review saw a dangerous shifts in U.S nuclear policy including the acquisitions of several types of low-yield nuclear weapons which has created concern as they are vulnerable to attack specifically cyberattacks. With high reliance on cyberspace, the danger from this attack grows severely.

**PHILIPPINES****Philippines-US alliance under Duterte: unravelling?/ Aaron Jed Rabena***RSIS Commentary : No. 0025, 11 February 2020 (F31)*

Since the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, various uncertainties have confronted Philippines-US relations. These are mainly due to human rights issues and the challenge posed by China in the South China Sea.

**RUSSIA-CHINA****Will Russia's pivot to Asia last?/ Chris Miller***Orbis: Volume 64, Issue 1, 2020, pp.43-57 (44)*

Will the Russian Federation's current 'turn to the East' have lasting significant? After the annexation of Crimea and the escalated confrontation with the West, Vladimir Putin's government declared it was turning to the East by cultivating ties both with the People's Republic of China and other governments. Russia has 'turned to the East' repeatedly throughout its history, from the tsarist era to the present day. In the past, geopolitical and economic factors have hindered Russia's Asian Pivots and caused the Kremlin to turn back toward Europe.

**SINGAPORE****The political economy of welfare in Singapore : explaining continuity and change/ Gyu Jin Hwang***Policy Studies : Vol 41, No 1, January 2020, pp.63-79*

This article addresses the question of how this continuity has been possible for so long and whether it is likely to continue. It argues that institutional coherence that is provided through a set of idenational frameworks is central in unpacking the stories behind Singapore's road to development.

**COVID-19: trying times for Singapore's resilience/ Nazneen Mohsina***RSIS Commentary : No. 0031, 27 February 2020 (F31)*

As Singapore deals with COVID-19, the social resilience of its citizens is also being tested. Notwithstanding the initial panic among some, the country has so far displayed a rather sturdy spirit in the face of this new public health crisis that has spread globally.

## SINGAPORE

**Singapore keeps its spear tip sharp/ Jr Ng**

*Asian Military Review: Vol.28, Issue 1, February 2020, pp.30-33 (60)*

The Republic of Singapore has seen its armed forces experiencing a full modernisation as they intent to maintain their title as the most modern defence forces in Asia Pacific.

## TERRORISM

**Less lethal, more universal/ Lilly Chapa**

*Security Management: March 2019, pp.22-24 (92)*

Deaths from terror attacks have declined for the third year in a row especially due to the continuous decline of ISIS in Iraq and Syria combined with an increased emphasis on counterterrorism globally. But terrorism still affected more countries in 2017 than in previous years.

**The security-prejudice nexus: "Islamist" terrorism and the structural logics of Islamophobia in the UK/ Mark Gilks**

*Critical Studies on Terrorism: Vol 13, No 1, March 2020, pp. 24-46 (112)*

This evidence also reveals an empirical link to "Islamist" terrorism, revealing a nexus between security and the social emergence of prejudice. Drawing on critical approaches to security and applying them to the case of the UK in 2017, this article explores this nexus conceptually and empirically. It examines the discourses of various governance institutions (including the media, the political elite, and security professionals) as they respond to "Islamist" terrorist events. It argues that these governance institutions individually and collectively.

## UNITED STATES

**Blurred lines: gray-zone conflict and hybrid war- two failures of American strategic thinking/ Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside**

*Naval War College Review : Vol 73 No 1, Winter 2020, pp.13-48 (F22)*

This article argues that the adoption of two prominent and fashionable theoretical terms and their various iterations - the gray zone or grayzone conflict (usually described as the space between peace and war) and hybrid war (often described as Russia's new form of mixed-methods warfare birthed by General Valery Gerasimov) - is an example of an American failure to think clearly about political, military, and strategic issues and their vitally important connections.

**Should the United States support a Republic of Korea nuclear submarine program?/ Jihoon Yu and Erik French**

*Naval War College Review : Vol 73 No 1, Winter 2020, pp.84-106 (F22)*

This article discusses how a Republic of Korea (ROK) SSN program could result in strategic risks or benefits, or both, for the United States. The risks of such a policy are readily apparent. First, the project might undermine already-fragile Sino-allied and ROK-Japan relations, damaging regional stability. Second, it might create nonproliferation concerns by expanding the ROK's latent nuclear capabilities. Third, an ROK SSN program would involve major opportunity costs; the resources necessary to fund it inevitably would siphon ROK resources away from investments in other crucial capabilities.

**UNITED STATES**

**US Indo-Pacific strategy: expanding the military footprint in the Asia-Pacific theatre/ Tomas Chlebecek**

*Military Technology: Vol. XLIV, Issue 2, 2020, pp.16-20 (38)*

In the three years since President Trump became President of the United States, the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed a series of disruptive events in both the economic and security domains, many of which have not been inevitable. However they have simply added to underlying long-term trends and problems in the region of the world that is the largest, in terms of both population and economic output. In addition, this already important region is set to become even more prominent in the near future.

**VIETNAM**

**Vietnam's ASEAN chairmanship 2020: what to expect/ Frederick Kliem**

*RSIS Commentary : No. 0021, 4 February 2020 (F31)*

Vietnam was long perceived as a security threat by other ASEAN members, before it joined ASEAN in 1995. But the country has since emerged as one of the fastest growing economies and the shining stars of ASEAN. There will be plenty to watch this year.

**WAR ON TERROR**

**Sousveillance the 'Global War on Terror'/ Roger Stahl and Sebastian Kaempf**

*Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol.73 Issue 4, August 2019, pp.337-356 (36)*

This article theorises what it means to challenge official regimes of surveillance in the War on Terror by further developing the notion of 'sousveillance'. In particular, we focus on the performative dimension of surveillance by attending to its sites of struggle, particularly where alternative and counter-performances work to disrupt and dislodge official regimes of vision. The article begins by considering what it means to call surveillance 'performative' and how such official performances have had a documented chilling effect on free expression and democratic deliberation.

**WOMEN AT WAR**

**Women at war : understanding the impacts of combat on women's educational attainment/ Laura Armye**

*Defence and Peace Economics: Vol 31, No. 1, January 2020, pp.34-47*

This paper focuses on a specific preliminary indicator of social and economic well-being, the pursuit of higher education post-service. It examines the impact of deployment and exposure to intense combat for women who served in the most high-risk occupations open to them in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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